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BANKS ARE OBSOLETE-AND WHO CARES
EDWARD E. FURASH'

In the emerging global financial structure, the banks that we
know and cherish will be obsolete. Other than the armies of bankers,
regulators, lawyers, and consultants whose jobs will be at stake-who
cares? And why should we? We know that the functions of banking
are essential to a modem economy, but if some other entity can bring
savers together with borrowers; absorb credit, interest rate, exchange,
or maturity transformation risk; provide a reliable payments system;
facilitate monetary policy; or provide fiduciary and safekeeping
services faster, smarter, or cheaper than banks, then it will replace
banks. This is precisely what has been taking place and will continue
to take place unless we act to prevent it.
I. WHY WE OUGHT To CARE
Well, we ought to care, and we ought to do something about it,
because banks play a special role in creating prosperity. Until we can
be certain that the new financial structure, the new financial
processes, and the myriad of new financial players can do as well or
better than banks, banking, and bankers have done over the past few
thousand years, we should think hard before we toss banks aside. We
run an enormous risk by not moving aggressively to transform banks
into the new financial institutions that are needed to ensure
prosperity tomorrow.
All societies seek economic and social prosperity in some form.
We often overlook this fundamental goal when thinking about the
structure we need for our financial system. We can become so
involved in arcane discussions about deposit insurance, interstate
branching, or derivatives safety that we neglect the fundamental
purpose of banking-to facilitate trade and to foster investment in
order to create prosperity.

' Chairman, Furash & Company, Washington, District of Columbia; A.B., 1956,
Harvard College; M.B.A., 1958, University of Pennsylvania.
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II. THE PURPOSE OF BANKING ISPROSPERITY
The foundation of prosperity is a sound currency and a reliable
payments system. Without these, we would have economic anarchy.
Investors would see no basis for putting money at risk. Savers would
worry about the value of their money and inflation. Goods and
services would not change hands, because payment would not be
certain. The result of this economic anarchy would be poverty, not
prosperity. The purpose of banking is to provide a stable world in
which commerce can flourish. In a simple economy, the chieftain
need only ensure that barter does not lead to violence and that
everyone understands the worth of a cocoa bean or a cowrie shell. In
a complex economy, such as ours, many devices are needed to create
and ensure stability. These are the functions of banking. Those of
you who have traveled to Eastern Europe or Russia know how the
lack of simple monetary and banking devices impedes the economic
stability that is necessary to lead to prosperity. The post-war German
and Japanese economic miracles came about through banking and
through the governmental efforts to ensure a sound currency and a
reliable payments system, thereby providing the stability needed to
facilitate trade and foster investment.
Stability is significantly undermined when banking functions are
performed by multiple, uncoordinated financial entities. During the
past twenty years our financial system has fragmented significantly,
with many new financial entities picking off banking functions,
because they were less regulated or unregulated, more efficient, more
aggressive, or quicker to see an opportunity than banks. All to the
good, most would say, and a true demonstration of how a free market
economy works and overcomes barriers. But none of this could have
happened if banks were not at the core of financial activitiesensuring sound currency and a reliable payments system. Banks have
provided the stability and framework that, in essence, handed
nonbanks the tools necessary to pick away at banking activities.
The truth is, as banks become increasingly less relevant,
something must replace them in providing the coordinating and
stabilizing functions required in a free market economy. At this
point, no such institutional structure has emerged, despite all of the
proposals circulating in Congress. This is why we should care about
strengthening banking.
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III. THINGS DON'T WORK THE WAY THEY SHOULD

Many of us will try to measure the decline of banking in terms of
market share, value-added contribution, or by adding back offbalance sheet activities so as to reflect the continued importance of
banking. All of this is interesting, but it is not particularly relevant.
Even if we produce measures that show that banking has not lost its
share of financial activity, we cannot ignore the evidence from the
financial marketplace of what is really happening. Traditional banks
have lost their economic influence.
We know by observation alone that the banking system doesn't
work the way it used to-if it does at all-in fostering prosperity.
Money supply data no longer provides an accurate measure of
economic activity or serves as an instrument for monetary policy.
Policy makers have had to shift their focus to interest rates and
commodity prices instead. The fact that this shift has been somewhat
successful does not replace the need for a banking system that works.
Look at the difficulty that we are having in controlling the slide
of the dollar. And think about the near hysteria over the risks in
derivatives. The game and guidelines are the same, but actions do
not produce the results that they did in the past. To borrow from
Gilbert and Sullivan, we are playing economic billiards with elliptical
balls and warped cues.
At best, we are muddling through; at worst, we have lost the
handle on the way to create economic well-being. One hallmark of
civilization-and certainly of our nation-is to ensure prosperity for
us and our posterity. That is why we should care about banks.
IV. ARE BANKS STILL SPECIAL?
In 1982, Gerald Corrigan, then president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis, presented a noteworthy case that banks were
special because they provided three crucial economic functions: (1)
payments and store of value-banks issue transaction accounts, for
instance, they hold liabilities payable on demand at par and that are
readily transferable to third parties; (2) stability-banks serve as the
back-up source of liquidity for all other institutions, financial and
nonfinancial; and (3) sound currency-banks are the transmission
belt for monetary policy.
And in fifteen short years, the influence of banking on these
activities eroded significantly, weakening our ability to ensure the
sound currency and reliable payments system needed to create the
stability required to facilitate trade and foster investment.
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For example, while banks still dominate the traditional payments
system directed at transfer of monetary value, our recent study on the
Future of the Payments System for The Bankers Roundtable
concluded that users-consumers, businesses, and governmentsneither care nor take for granted the risk absorption, settlement
finality, and liquidity that banks provide. They see these payments
system elements as entitlements for which they need not pay;
therefore, they are turning to nonbanks that provide the value-added
payments information they seek and for which they will pay.
Traditional monetary transfer is now a commodity, and nonbankers
ride on this transmission system by providing added value payments
services.
They could not do this, of course, if our banks and the Federal
Reserve had not created one of the world's best payment systems.
But these nonbank activities have pulled revenue away from banks,
weakening their profitability and their role in financial services.
Similarly, consumers can get virtual transaction accounts from
insurance companies, finance companies, brokerage firms, and
mutual funds. Moreover, bank deposits clearly are not seen as a
superior store of value over money market mutual funds by large
segments of the public. In sum, banks are no longer special in the
payments system or in providing a reliable store of value.
By and large, banks still are an important source of liquidity to
other institutions. In this sense, they still must be relied on to
provide stability as they did for the mutual fund and securities
industry in the stock market crash of 1987. But they are not the
special source of stability. Other institutions now have direct access
to the Federal Reserve window. Government Sponsored Enterprises
(GSEs)-such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or Sallie Mae-now
provide stability to the mortgage and student loan markets. And
Congress and the Clinton Administration have talked seriously about
extending the GSE model to small business financing. Much more
could be said about securitization or direct market financing to
further prove the point that banks are not as special as they once
were in providing stability through back-up liquidity.
One only needs to look at the events of the past three years to
see deterioration in the role of banking as the transmission belt of
monetary policy. Capital markets, pension funds, and mutual funds
probably play a greater role than banks in the bond markets.
Synthetic securities with unknown market characteristics are
manufactured mainly by nonbanks. With the volume of direct
placement and junk bonds expanding, banks are no longer the prime
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money source for high-quality borrowers. When demand is weak, as
it was during the recent recessions, low rate business loans generally
do not lead the recovery. What led the way was a complex amalgam
of mortgage refinancing supported by the secondary market; cheap
consumer loans through securitization; and massive corporate
refinancing in the equities market. Pricing in financial services is now
set by the securities market, not banks. Securitization puts a ceiling
on consumer loan rates. Money market funds set the floor for
deposit/funding rates.
Sound currency is more difficult to maintain in this new
fragmented world. In other words, the new financial structure is
undermining, not enhancing, our economic well-being. So, we should
care about banks and what may replace them.
V. WHY ARE BANKS BECOMING OBSOLETE?
Why are banks becoming obsolete? Obviously, because they
have not been able to adapt to the new financial world. The
regulatory structure and financial services separations of the 1930sGlass-Steagall, deposit insurance-do not fit today's world. Even the
Bank Holding Company Act is antiquated. Banks still cannot engage
in many activities commonly included as banking in other parts of the
world. The gradual widening of powers in the past few years has
helped, but not enough. Banks now perform only twenty-five percent
of financial activities, down from fifty percent to sixty percent at the
end of World War II. While it is easy to blame banking's straight
jacket on past legislative and regulatory follies, they are only part of
the current problem. The need for change is widely recognized, and
one can only applaud the actions of the Federal Reserve and the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to widen banking powers,
particularly in the field of securities; however, but the emphasis on
banking reform is insufficient: what the country needs is total
financial services reform.
Three quite disparate forces have combined to put banks in a
box: fragmentation of the intermediation process; technology that
facilitates the change that undermines traditional banking; and
marked changes in customer preferences.
VI. INTERMEDIATION
The intermediation process has shifted away from institutions
that take principal risk by taking loans and investments on their
balance sheets and, in so doing, risk shareholder capital, toward
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placement facilitators who manage funds for others, but take little or
no capital risk. Commercial banks, life insurance companies, thrifts,
credit unions, broker/dealers, finance companies, and mortgage
banks still are wholly or partially traditional, complete
Retail mutual funds, trust funds, investment
intermediators.
managers, stockbrokers, GSEs, REITs, and financial guaranty
companies are facilitators that manage the money of others. Their
funds-gathering and investment management process is significantly
more efficient than traditional intermediators. Their growth has
been facilitated by securitization, synthetic securities, junk bonds,
and direct market debt placement by corporations.
The net effect is that the quality of credits available to banks has
declined, the volume of loans available has declined, and net interest
Dollar volume from
margins will probably also decline.
cost structures. When
bank
support
to
able
not
is
intermediation
banks have reached for risk to restore intermediation earnings, it has
been costly-as witnessed by the $500 billion taxpayer cost for the
bailout of the thrift industry or the numerous commercial bank
failures of the past decade. Compared to the past and relative to
current competitors, banks are weaker players in the intermediation
process, and (1) they are less able to act as the transmission belt of
monetary policy; (2) they play a smaller role in facilitating trade; and
(3) they are less significant in the process of ensuring stability and
prosperity. Yet no central market mechanism has emerged to
replace them in their role, and one wonders how much less of a role
banks can play before our financial markets become unstable. As
noted earlier, the securities market now sets both sides of
intermediation pricing. But this invisible hand is not sufficient to
replace banking's traditional role in fostering prosperity.
VII. TECHNOLOGY
Technology has been the great facilitator of banking's decline.
While it has enabled banks to become more efficient and to achieve
economies of scale in operations, it has also brought into the market
severe nonbank competition in, for example, credit cards and
mortgage banking.
We could not have the securitization or synthetic securities that
have raped bank balance sheets without the computers that make
them possible. Nor could nonbanks have created complementary
payments systems without technology access to the bank payments
system and the ability to simulate bank products. Technology has
enabled nonbanks to create the information-based investment
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management, programmed trading, and comprehensive customer
statements that provide them with a considerable edge over banks.
In the past, banks have been able to adapt to technology change.
Banking is an information business. In banking-in all financial
services-knowledge is power. And payments systems rely on
transferring information, whether a letter of credit on a Medici bank
or a wire transfer tomorrow.
Banks have been able to adjust to signal fires and semaphores,
messengers and carrier pigeons, sailing ships and steam ships,
telegraph and telephone. But they have not been able to adapt to the
new competitors created by making information ubiquitously
available through computers and modem telecommunications.
Computers create new financial markets by enabling information to
be gathered and widely disseminated by telecommunications.
Nonbank competitors can create place-and-time advantages over
banks. In sum, the computer and modern telecommunications have
enabled nonbanks to simulate banking services and functions in ways
that customers cannot distinguish, and even prefer.
VIII. CUSTOMER PREFERENCES

Customers have tried these new financial services and like the
heady wine of money funds, draft accounts, cash management, and
electronic data interchange. They have and will continue to shift
from a savings mentality, which favors bank guaranteed deposit
returns, to an investor mentality, which favors using facilitators to
produce riskier but superior market returns.
Our nation is going through a deep cultural change from saver
consumers whose attitudes were formed by the Great Depression and
World War II, to investor consumers whose attitudes were forged by
the rebellion of the 1960s and the Great Inflation that followed in the
1970s. Corporations seek radically new financial services, like
information-based inventory and cash management. They also seek
to hedge against rate and market risks. Nonbanks have become the
preferred providers of these activities. While banks have an enviable
customer base and the game is theirs to lose, lose it they will if
restricted by regulation or legislation. Currently, the banks are
playing catch-up. And in the customer's eyes, banks are less
competitive and less important to them than in the past.
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IX. CAN BANKS BE REPLACED?
With all of this, financial services in general, and banking in
particular, have become a much riskier business in every way. The
thrift and bank failures of the past decade have prompted a
regressive attitude by Congress. No legislator wanted to go home
and tell voters that the cost of maintaining economic stability was by
underwriting the deposit insurance funds. In the attempt to make
banking accident-proof and risk-proof, government has fostered
regulations that micromanage the industry and that weaken the role
of banking in facilitating trade and encouraging investment-our real
goal of creating prosperity. In sum, a new financial structure is
emerging in which traditional banks are becoming obsolete, and they
are being replaced by new entities and processes.
This is a paradox-since none of these things could happen if
banks were not strong and had not been providers of liquidity and a
reliable payments system. But as banking's role declines, no
institution or structure is emerging to orchestrate and coordinate our
economic well-being. And if banks disappear, we will have to invent
something else to take their place as stabilizers.
The solution is not to spread banking functions among multiple
uncoordinated entities. The solution is to strengthen banks so as to
create even greater free market competition in financial services.
Banks will then be strong enough to continue to fulfill their core
purpose of fostering a sound currency and a reliable payments
system. Strong banks with broad powers establish the financial core
that supports diverse financial specialists. Weak banks will cause
financial specialists to contract, because weak banks cannot provide
the liquidity that financial specialists require. In that event, it seems
likely that the economy will be worse, not better-despite the belief
that nonbank financial companies will proliferate to take up the
vacuum. These emerging entities are neither strong enough nor
comprehensive enough to pick up banking's economic role.
The core problem in keeping banks strong is the fragmentation
of the intermediation process. Prior to the Civil War, our banking
system was based primarily on the issuance of redeemable bank
notes. Since then, banking has turned increasingly into a direct
intermediation business, taking deposits and making loans. Spread
income, as we all know, is still the primary source of bank earnings.
But deposits have moved out of banks to facilitator investment
managers, and fewer loans are available at higher risk, severely
weakening bank profitability. This bank earnings model outlived its
usefulness twenty years ago, but restrictions on banking activities
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prevented both loan risk diversification and new sources of income
from coming to the rescue. The troubles that followed are well
known. While banks were weakened, nonbanks quickly dominated
the new securities industry, the new finance industry, the new
processing businesses, and the hot new field of investment
management.
X. WHAT TO DO

What needs to occur to strengthen banks is so simple that we
easily lose sight of it. Therefore, it needs repeating-lessen
dependence on dying intermediation businesses; increase capital
markets activities, including such frightening activities as investment
banking, trading, and investments in derivatives (the forbidden "D"
word); and increase fee-based businesses, particularly payments
systems, investment management, and servicing businesses such as
mortgage banking.
These strategies, along with cost-cutting,
consolidation and mergers, interstate branching, service quality, and
stringent risk management are the "rosary beads" of bank
management today.
Rebalancing these income streams will be no simple task. First,
there is new formidable nonbank competition in all of these
businesses. Second, replacing loan intermediation with trading or
derivatives requires new risk management skills that most banks do
not have. Third, the volume of fee income as a facilitator, processor,
or investment manager needed to replace lost spread revenue is very
large. Except for a few banks, it may not be possible. All of this
rebalancing must come with safety and soundness-by management
prudence and regulation that supports, not impedes the restructuring
process. The result will be a radically different banking industry with
fewer players that will individually be stronger in terms of their
ability to influence the economy and foster prosperity. But despite
their size, these banks will still be small players in the financial
services industry.
Current bank strategies are not sufficient to enable banks to
become the broad gauge financial companies our country needs. A
far better solution is to let banks out of their box and to encourage
the melding together of all financial services companies, enabling the
free market to create the new financial services industry needed to
ensure stability and a sound currency. In effect, recognize that the
future requires financial service companies that happen to carry out
banking functions, and allow this evolution occur. Otherwise,
instability will result. We are perilously close, in my view, to what
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Robert Eisenbeis, a former professor of the University of North
Carolina, called an electronic barter world.
The history of money and banking is a tale about the role of
government in creating or destroying prosperity over the past few
thousand years. The U.S. Constitution states that a purpose of
government is to establish a sound currency. In addition, we, as a
nation, are committed to fostering prosperity. We are already the
economic miracle that the world envies. Frankly, our banking system
played a major role, if not the major role, in creating our prosperity.
For the past sixty years, our governmental philosophy was that this
was best done by restricting banks and by holding banks hostage
through regulation geared to deposit insurance. In the process,
banking has become quasi-nationalized and is unable to fill its proper
economic role.
In the long sweep of monetary history, these past sixty years are
an aberration. It is time to recognize that we cannot succeed by
micromanaging banks or other financial service providers. The task
is too complex and, frankly, it is falling of its own weight. It is time to
recognize that this philosophy no longer applies and must be
repealed.
There are four major steps that must be taken. First, as noted
earlier, we need to recognize that financial services reform and
restructuring is the key issue, not banking reform. We must charter
new, broad gauge financial companies that become the transmission
belts of monetary policy, ensure a reliable payments system and
sound currency, and have the true strength to provide back-up
liquidity. Second, we must have a radical revision-even sharp
reduction-of the regulatory structure and combine financial
regulation to suit the new structure, concurrently eliminating the
Congressional turfdoms that prevent reform. Third, we must remove
the millstone of federal deposit insurance by making it available only
to small balance consumers and businesses and letting capital ratings
and private insurance take up the slack. Fourth, we must stop
bleeding financial services companies for social engineering purposes.
There are other, more direct means to achieve social justice that do
not distort our financial system.
If banks did not exist, we would have to invent something new to
ensure the sound currency and reliable payments system needed for
tomorrow's stability and prosperity. That is why we must care about
banks. It is time to turn back the clock, to recognize that our sixtyyear experiment must end. We need a new system-a strong central
bank, the creative tension of dual regulation and chartering, and
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financial companies that can engage in all financial service activities
in a free market world.
Bluntly, we need to throw out the financial system and start
over. Sadly, there is little or no stomach for such radical changes
among the members of the U.S. Congress. Special interest groups
are able to hold reform efforts hostage in order to obtain special
advantages. Frankly, with their livelihoods at stake, who can blame
them? This is, however, short-term thinking. In the long term, the
resistance to reform will weaken our ability to ensure prosperity by
growing the economy.
For the heart of the issue of banking reform is ensuring
economic growth. Americans are becoming increasingly discouraged
by the decline in their purchasing power-they work harder and
harder and receive less and less. Lack of economic growth is a key
reason that Americans believe the American dream is no longer
being realized.
The changes needed-a major overhaul of the tax system, the
downsizing of government, and the encouragement of high savings
and lower debt-are wholly intertwined with a renaissance of a
strong banking system.
Historically, when financial reform is stymied at the federal
level, the states turn their attention to reform. For instance, NOW
accounts, home state credit card advantage, and many other changes
were initiated by populist state legislators. While the Fed and the
OCC are changing the financial system through piecemeal regulatory
permission of new banking activities, these changes are both
insufficient and fragmented. The opportunity exists for states to
adopt initiatives that break down the old system and establish a new
system. There are at least two ways that states may accomplish this
reform: (1) offer either a new charter for a financial company that
has privatized deposit insurance and can sell insured and uninsured
products or a charter that facilitates debanking by enabling banks to
shift deposits to money funds; (2) amend securities powers under
state blue sky laws that enable the direct sale of small denomination
asset-backed securities to consumers. These moves would create
competition for the old banking structure and would enable banks to
resume their traditional role in creating prosperity. In sum, banks
and thrifts should turn to the states for the powers they need to do
the job.

